Julie Bishop - Member for Curtin

Address to NSW Jewish Board of Deputies, Sydney - The day after Iran goes nuclear

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Last weekend the New York Times ran an article titled “Iran, the United States and a Nuclear See Saw.”

It set out a timeline of the Iran/US relationship during the 20th and now the 21st century which demonstrated that over time the two countries have spent as many decades as friends as they have, more recently, spent as enemies.

I am indebted to this article for reminding me of the twists and turns in the relationship over the years – for example in 1957 the US signed an Iran/US Agreement for Cooperation concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy – as part of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program.

Subsequent Presidents have found that nuclear issues have played an ever present role in the relationship – at first constructive and now destructive.

The state visit of the Shah and Empress of Iran and the photos of the glamorous couple with the equally glamorous Kennedys at a White House reception in 1962 evoked memories of a by-gone era in international relations.

It was in 1968 that Iran signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and in 1975 that President Ford authorised the sale of an American built nuclear processing plant to Iran and permitted US material to be fabricated into fuel in Iran for use in its reactors.

Thirty years later Henry Kissinger said of this time "they were an allied country and this was a commercial transaction. We didn't address the question of them one day moving toward nuclear weapons”.

After the overthrow of the Shah and the return of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, the following decade saw the storming of the US Embassy and the hostage crisis, Iraq’s invasion of Iran and the eight year war, the Iran contra deal, the death of the Ayatollah, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

We now know but didn't then, that in the late 1980s Iranian scientists were receiving nuclear training in Pakistan and there were nuclear transfers through Pakistan's nuclear weapons expert Dr Kahn and other international suppliers.

In the 1990s Iran and Russia signed a nuclear contract for a nuclear power plant on the Persian Gulf Coast.

And in a sign of things to come, President Clinton imposed sanctions on foreign companies investing in Iran and Libya who he described as the two most dangerous supporters of terrorism worldwide.

By 2002 the United Nations were made aware of Iran’s clandestine nuclear program and Iran agreed to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In 2004 Iran agreed to a temporary suspension of its enrichment program convincing the IAEA that it did not intend to build nuclear weapons – the so called Paris Agreement.

In August 2005 Ahmadinejad was elected President of Iran – the heat began to rise.

By the following February the IAEA reported Iran to the UNSC and called for a halt to its enrichment activities citing numerous breaches of the NNPT and the “absence of confidence” that Iran’s nuclear program was for peaceful purposes, prompting President Bush to call on the UNSC to act.

The first round of UNSC sanctions took place after nine months of negotiations – importantly it was a unanimous decision.

In 2009, after a strategy of engagement, President Obama demanded that international inspectors view the Iranian enrichment plant and in 2010 the fourth round of sanctions were imposed on military purchases, trade and financial transactions by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards which control the program.

Last year Iranian protestors stormed the British Embassy in retaliation for the British sanctions on Iranian banks alleged to be helping the nuclear program.

So, what is the current situation?

Iran has consistently denied that it is pursuing nuclear weapons and insists that its current nuclear program is entirely peaceful and for the purposes of power generation, research and medicine.

However, to placate the world about its intentions Iran will have to be entirely transparent in its operations and cooperate fully with international inspectors and monitors.

Iran has failed to meet that obligation and there are serious and legitimate concerns about some of Iran's nuclear activities which indicate the pursuit of weapons capability.

A team of senior officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency held discussions in Iran on 20 and 21 February this year and formally asked for permission to visit an Iranian military base.

Iranian officials refused that request, adding to the suspicions about Iran's nuclear intentions.

The onus is on Iran to explain why it has refused full access for international inspectors to some sites if - as it claims - there is nothing to hide and the nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only.

As history has shown, this ongoing pattern of behaviour - with a refusal to cooperate with international inspectors leads to a steadily strengthened range of sanctions which now include bans on the purchase of Iranian crude oil and financial sanctions against Iran's central bank.

Recently an international financial messaging system –the Society for World Wide Interbank financial telecommunication – cut off its service to two dozen Iranian banks – effectively preventing these institutions from electronically transferring funds.

In this volatile context, there is a very serious game of bluff and counter bluff under way.

If the world assumes – as it is entitled – that Iran is developing a nuclear weapons capability, and an attack were made to prevent the completion of the program, Iran has threatened to place shipping mines in the Strait of Hormuz – thus disrupting a key source of global oil supplies, with about 30 per cent of seaborne oil passing through the Strait.

Unofficial analysis from the United States suggests it would take several months to clear the Strait of mines, and on the assumption that such work were to proceed unimpeded.

Obviously it would take much longer if any naval ships in the Strait were operating under attack from Iran.

Iran has also threatened other forms of unspecified retaliation in now familiar provocative and colourful language.

However it can be assumed this would take the form of threats of terrorism by Iranian agents or by proxy organisations funded by Iran, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, among others.

A key source of recent speculation has been whether Israel will undertake a military strike against Iran, with or without the support of the United States.

It is not easy to discern the extent to which this threat is a tactic to increase pressure on Iran, for which it is obviously intended, or whether it is an action that the Israeli government is seriously contemplating in the near future.

The words of President Obama in a speech on 4 March this year are worth repeating here:

“I have said that when it comes to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, I will take no options off the table, and I mean what I say.

That includes all elements of American power: A political effort aimed at isolating Iran; a diplomatic effort to sustain our coalition and ensure that the Iranian program is monitored; an economic effort that imposes crippling sanctions; and, yes, a military effort to be prepared for any contingency.

Iran’s leaders should understand that I do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. And as I have made clear time and again during the course of my presidency, I will not hesitate to use force when it is necessary to defend the United States and its interests.”

In the face of threats of military action from the United States and Israel and under a severe blanket of sanctions, why is Iran refusing to cooperate with international nuclear inspectors?

There have been various analyses put forward but one worth considering was offered by Stratfor’s George Friedman.

He points out that Iran has historically felt threatened by larger empires and larger powers.

It has survived through a combination of force, negotiation and by playing the larger powers off against each other.

According to Friedman, Iran was responsible for a campaign of false information which convinced the United States of the need to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein – Iran's mortal enemy.

While the US decision to invade Iraq was obviously taken on a wide range of considerations, his contention raises an interesting scenario.

Friedman suggests that Iran has mostly taken a defensive posture in its manoeuvrings, but believes that in recent times it has asserted itself more aggressively outside its borders with the intent of building greater regional influence.

Whether or not it was partially responsible for the removal of Hussein, the Shi'ite regime in Iran certainly sees an opportunity in Iraq, particularly through its links to the 65 per cent of Iraqis who are Shi'ites.

This fact and the subsequent reduction in US troop numbers in the Middle East has encouraged Iran to attempt to promote further its regional influence.

It is suspected that Iran is providing moral and possibly material support to the Shi'ite community in Bahrain that makes up 70 per cent of the population and which has been protesting the rule of the Sunni Royal family.

Similarly, Iran has been a strong supporter of the Assad regime in Syria, dominated by followers of Alawite Shia Islam.

There is an eerie comparison between the Iranians and the tactics of the North Koreans, who have used a nuclear weapons program to ensure the survival of the regime.

Friedman believes that actually attaining the technology to launch a nuclear weapon on a ballistic missile is largely irrelevant to this tactic – the key is for the regime to have a nuclear weapons program that increases its importance and potentially extends its influence – whether it be Iran or North Korea.

It can be argued that the sanctions regime has been imposed because the US and the international community are loathe to use military force - and that is a point not lost in Tehran.

While the US may be able to gamble on Iran not actually building a nuclear warhead, Israel does not have that luxury – in case it is wrong.

However, there is a theory that an attack by Israel, even if successful in destroying  Iran's nuclear program, could work to increase Iranian influence – particularly if the regime carried out its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz inflicting serious damage on the world economy.

The regime could use that threat to extract concessions from the US and Europe that work in its long-term favour.

Additionally, if an Israeli attack did not completely destroy the Iranian nuclear program, that could also be seen as a military victory of sorts for Iran, again increasing its regional influence.

I believe we must assume that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability - for if we accept that Iran is on a mission to build regional influence and power, such a strategy would be hugely boosted if it were to acquire nuclear weapons.

Another complicating factor is that this is a US Presidential election year.

While Iran has been a factor in US Presidential elections for three decades, there is a difference in campaign rhetoric between the Republicans and President Obama.

The Republicans are taking a more aggressive tone than President Obama, who is coming under fire for his 2007 election policy of seeking engagement with the regime.

On numerous occasions President Obama wrote directly to the Ayatollah.

The response was a deafening silence.

Despite the rebuffed attempts at engagement, President Obama persisted until events inside Iran in 2009 overwhelmed any suggestion of re-engagement.

The regime cracked down on protestors in the wake of the re-election of President Ahmadinejad, amid widespread claims of electoral fraud and vote rigging.

The brutal crackdown on unarmed protestors led to international condemnation of the regime and further isolated it.

Since that time the focus has been largely on the tightening of sanctions, with the aim of starving the regime of funds and the hope of its overthrow.

Republican Presidential candidate Mitt Romney claims that he will categorically prevent Iran attaining nuclear weapons, although he has ruled out US soldiers on the ground in Iran to achieve that goal.

President Obama has responded with, “if some of these folks think that it's time to launch a war, they should say so. They should explain to the American people exactly why they would do that and what the consequences would be. Everything else is just talk.”

Senior Fellow on Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute's Suzanne Maloney forecasts that whomever wins the US presidential election later this year they will be more likely to adopt a position of what she describes as “deferring and deterring” - that is, using a range of tools to slow the regime's nuclear program and impose strong disincentives through sanctions and other means.

However, that leaves unanswered the implications for the US presidential election, of Israel acting alone and attacking Iran, and the implications of a US miscalculation that leads to a nuclear-armed Iran.

Shibley Telhami also a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute has provided an assessment of the Israeli and Arab implications of the Iranian nuclear program and his points are worth repeating:

First, an Israeli strike prior to the election would make the Iranian issue critical for the outcome of that election, with a strike after the election potentially triggering a different US decision about involvement.

Some Israelis are backing away from describing Iran's nuclear program as a threat to Israel's existence, because it was undermining national confidence and portraying Israel as weak.

Telhami argues that the stronger the sanctions the more likely that Iran will accelerate its development of a nuclear bomb, which would provide it with the deterrent it needs against external threats.

Telhami believes there will be no compromise through talks – the Iranians will not give up their right to enrich uranium and Israel cannot accept that.

He argues that the collapse of the Syrian regime closely allied with Iran may also contribute to an acceleration in the nuclear program, to increase Iran’s sense of security.

If Iran achieves nuclear weapons status, some Arab states will seek to follow, with Saudi Arabia most likely to pursue nuclear arms. A regional arms race would be likely to erupt.

According to Telhami, public opinion in the Arab world, gleaned from polls, shows that while there is concern about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons there is also a sense that it would balance the threat from the US and Israel.

He says any attempt to establish a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East will be impossible to achieve because Israel will not give up its weapons while so many of its neighbours and other nations in the region remain hostile toward it.

This analysis reveals the bind in which the US may well find itself after an Israeli strike, if we assume such action is likely or perhaps inevitable.

The key question is at what point do the United States and Israel reach the conclusion that diplomacy, persuasion or sanctions have failed and that Iran is actively seeking to construct a nuclear weapon?

If there is a miscalculation of Iran’s capabilities, what will happen the day after Iran goes nuclear?

The first and most immediate impact I believe will be an arms race in the Middle East that is likely to spread to North Africa.

If nuclear proliferation spreads its tentacles from Iran, countries such as Egypt will be likely to start down that path.

There is a process under way in Egypt of transferring power from the military to a civilian government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and other radical Islamist parties.

What hope would there be that Iran would not proliferate its technology?

Israel's Defence Minister Ehud Barak said some time ago that he did not “belong to those who think that if Iran has a nuclear weapon, it will hurry to drop it on a neighbour.”

Barak believed a greater danger was that “a nuclear weapon will reach a terrorist group which will not hesitate to use it immediately. It will send it in a container with a GPS to a leading port in the US, Europe or Israel.”

There is no doubt that Iran's close links and support for terrorist organisations should be a critical consideration in the calculations about this issue.

From Australia's perspective, we should be cautious in supporting the US or Israel taking the first step on the ladder of escalation to military conflict from which it would be impossible to retreat.

While every option must remain on the table, as President Obama has stated, Australia can play an important role in providing strong support for sanctions and other actions against the regime to send a clear message that the world is united in its condemnation.

The history of sanctions suggests they are only effective when universally applied and enforced.

That has not been the case with Iran as some nations continue to trade with the regime.

There is no doubt that the current sanctions are hurting the Iranian regime.

However, it is important that Iran be under no illusions about the determination of nations that object to its behaviour and its ongoing refusal to allow unfettered access to IAEA inspectors.

Whatever happens, a critical juncture is afoot in Washington, Tel Aviv and Tehran.

If Tehran doesn’t change its behaviour, a decision will made in coming months either to attack Iran or learn to live with the consequences of a nuclear armed Iran in the Middle East.

It is a diabolical dilemma.